After a three-month session riddled with heated debates, filibusters, walkouts, and even fistfights, the ROC’s Second National Assembly passed ten constitutional amendments on July 29. It was the assembly’s third session since 1990 to focus on revising the Constitution. The amendments were essentially the package proposed by the Kuomintang (KMT), which used its more than three-fourths majority in the assembly to override objections from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and other minority parties.
The most important changes were outlined in the 1st and 2nd amendments, which stipulates the following:
Direct election of the president—The 2nd Amendment begins with the statement: “The president and vice president shall be directly elected by the entire populace of the free area of the Republic of China.” The first direct election is to be held in 1996. Since 1948, the president has been elected by the National Assembly.
Limiting the premier’s right to countersign on presidential appointments and dismissals—The 2nd Amendment also states that presidential orders to appoint or dismiss personnel approved by the Legislature or National Assembly no longer require the countersignature of the premier. This diminishes slightly the power of the premier, and boosts that of the president.
Expanding the powers of the National Assembly—Traditionally, the primary duties of the National Assembly were to amend the Constitution and to elect a president every six years. From 1947 to 1991, it convened only to perform the latter duty, aside from a few meetings to revise the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.”
The 1st Amendment includes several provisions expanding the duties and responsibilities of the National Assembly. One provision creates speaker and deputy speaker posts to preside over assembly meetings. These will replace the current presidium beginning with the Third National Assembly, which convenes in May 1996. Another states that the assembly should meet at least once a year, and that if two-fifths of assembly members agree that extra meetings are needed, they can petition the president to hold additional meetings. Most controversial is the final statement in the amendment, which reads: “The procedure for the exercise of powers by the National Assembly shall be determined by the assembly itself.” Many politicians fear that this gives the assembly carte blanche in determining its own powers.
The expansion of the National Assembly’s power is one of the most controversial aspects of the new amendments. Some politicians, especially KMT assembly members, support the move. They hope to build the assembly into a second legislative chamber, thus creating a bicameral system. Others, DPP members in particular, oppose the move since they hope to abolish the National Assembly altogether.
To analyze what these new amendments mean for Taiwan’s political development, on September 3, the Central News Agency invited four prominent politicians and political analysts to offer their views. They were: Shieh Lung-sheng (謝隆盛), director-general of the KMT’s Party-Government Coordination Department of the National Assembly; Hsu Yang-ming (許陽明), leader of the DPP caucus in the National Assembly; Su Yeong-chin (蘇永欽), a professor of law at National Chengchi University and a KMT National Assembly member; and political analyst Lu Ya-li (呂亞力), a professor of political science at National Taiwan University. Excerpts follow.
Shieh Lung-sheng: Because the KMT occupies four-fifths of the seats in the National Assembly. it dominated the constitutional revision process. Although some disputes arose during the session, there were major achievements. First and foremost, the amendment allowing direct popular election of the president and vice president is a great step toward genuine democracy and may trigger drastic change in Taiwan’s political environment.
Second, the premier’s power to countersign presidential appointments and dismissals has been limited. This will help our constitutional democracy develop more smoothly.
Third, since a speaker and deputy speaker will replace the current presidium, the National Assembly will no longer be led by a collective leadership. This should make our meetings more efficient.
Fourth, the provisions concerning government-run financial enterprises and the salaries of legislators indicate the KMT’s intention to keep social reform hand in hand with political reform. [The 9th Amendment reads: “The State shall manage government-run financial organizations in line with the principles of business administration. The management, personnel, budgets, year-end audits, and statistical reports of government-run financial organizations shall be specially regulated by law.” The 7th Amendment states: “The remuneration and pay of the members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan shall be regulated by law.”]
In my opinion, the main cause of disputes between the DPP and KMT during this National Assembly session was that the parties have different views on national identity. For example, the DPP wanted to change “national unification” to “national development” and the “free area [of the Republic of China]” to “Taiwan” or “Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.” If such ideological differences cannot be smoothed over, the same disputes will arise again and again. Both sides should keep negotiating.
Revising the Constitution is so important that we must come to a consensus among the various parties. It is not wise to revise it every year unless there is a specific need. The most important thing is to make the new amendments meaningful by drawing up laws and implementing them as soon as possible.
Hsu Yang-ming: I disagree with most of what Mr. Shieh just said. In the first place, he called the results of this constitutional revision a success. To me, it was by no means successful. I would even say the new amendments undermine Taiwan’s political system.
There are several reasons why so little was achieved during this assembly session. First, there was a lack of public consensus on such issues as national identity, government structure, and protection of civil rights. Regrettably, the KMT insisted on forcing its way without compromise. It is only natural that they met with resistance.
Second, the public is demanding a government structure wherein those in power take corresponding responsibility. But we do not see this idea embodied in the new amendments.
Third, justice was compromised because the KMT disregarded the meeting rules. Constitutional revisions aim to safeguard the fundamental rights of the people and to foster national development. Thus, the Constitution must be acceptable to all political parties, particularly to the minority parties. Otherwise, once a minority party takes power, it will refuse to honor the Constitution. But during this session, KMT assembly members broke the rules many times in order to get their proposals passed. Under these circumstances, the DPP certainly does not endorse the amendments.
Mr. Shieh attributed the disorder in the meetings to disputes between the DPP and KMT over the issue of national identity. I beg to differ. National identity was not a major point for the DPP in this session. During the first readings, for example, among the DPP’s thirty-three proposals, only one concerned territorial issues. In it, we simply clarified that the Constitution applies to Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The term “Republic of Taiwan” never appeared in our proposals.
The disputes focused on the political system. The DPP holds that Taiwan should develop a presidential system [rather than the current system in which the president and premier share power] in order to give the leader both power and responsibility. But the KMT insists on sticking to the “five-power” government structure [made up of the Executive, Judicial, Legislative, Examination, and Control yuans, or branches of government], and on making only partial adjustments to the Constitution. As a result, we have a two-chamber [the Legislature and National Assembly], two-leader political system, which impedes democratic development.
Su Yeong-chin: Actually, the disputes concerning the meeting rules and the other disagreements are rooted in the December 1991 National Assembly election in which the DPP won less than one-fourth of the seats [a party must hold at least one-fourth of the seats to veto a constitutional amendment proposal]. In a two-party democracy, the minority party can use one of two strategies to exercise its power—oppose the majority only on major conflicts, or adhere strictly to all of its principles without compromise. With the DPP, the first approach is unlikely given the widespread support it has gained from local voters, as shown in recent major elections. And since the KMT won a solid majority in the National Assembly, it is difficult to persuade KMT assembly members to make concessions to the DPP. Besides, the growing pluralism within the KMT has made it difficult for members to reach a consensus. As a result, the process of constitutional revision is full of twists and turns.
Two approaches can be taken in revising the Constitution—a moderate one that keeps the original text intact while instituting amendments, or a total rewrite. The KMT has chosen the first option, believing this is what the public wants. But in taking this route, the KMT has failed to address the constitutional issues of highest priority. For example, the future of the National Assembly itself has become a major source of dispute. If this problem is not resolved, more chaos will follow. Unfortunately, during the recent assembly session, the KMT failed to address this problem due to lack of public consensus. It must be decided whether we should have a unicameral or bicameral Legislature. The sooner the better.
Lu Ya-li: In revising the Constitution, we should not focus on revising specific articles; we need to assess the overall structural problems in developing a constitutional democracy. More attention should be paid to the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Mr. Hsu just said that if the DPP takes power, it might rewrite the Constitution. That worries me. The success of a Constitution depends on how it is interpreted and implemented.
The recent constitutional amendments will have an impact on politics. While the premier’s power to countersign presidential decrees has been curtailed, the president’s power has been expanded. Direct election of the president also means that public opinion will carry greater weight in policymaking. Such a change will affect the government both positively and negatively.
Direct presidential elections will influence Taiwan in three ways. First, the major task of all political parties will be to prepare for the presidential election. Thus, the influence of local factions, which now play a major role in elections, will wane. Second, civic groups will become more important because their support could be decisive in close presidential races. Third, in presidential elections, candidates will appeal directly to voters. Hence, the mass media, TV in particular, will be an important campaign tool. By contrast, low-level local politicians [who garner public support for the political parties] will be much less important.
Another problem arising from the amendments is that the positions of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan must be clarified. With the creation of the National Assembly speaker post, the assembly may begin to convene on a regular basis. Besides, the assembly can use its power of constitutional revision to consolidate its position and increase its political leverage. This will complicate its relations with the Legislature. Unlike the British and Japanese systems, in which the lower house holds the real power, both our National Assembly and Legislature have real powers; the former revises the Constitution and the latter makes laws. In case of a dispute between the two houses, the Council of Grand Justices resolves the issue through constitutional interpretation. This is why interpretation and implementation of the Constitution is a vital task.
Shieh: As a member of the KMT Constitutional Reform Task Force who took part in drawing up constitutional proposals within the KMT, I would like to clear up some points raised by other guests today
Professor Su just mentioned that one major problem with the revisions is the [1st Amendment] provision reading: “The procedure for the exercise of powers by the National Assembly shall be determined by the assembly itself.” The reason for the amendment is that the Legislature recently set up a committee to propose constitutional amendments. Because the National Assembly has the power to vote on such amendments submitted by the Legislature, it should design a set of rules on reviewing such proposals.
Professor Lu worries that the creation of speaker and deputy speaker posts in the National Assembly might give the assembly significant power [whereas many people wish to abolish the assembly]. The speaker is in fact a symbolic post whose function is simply to “represent the National Assembly and preside over its meetings” [according to the 1st Amendment]. The speaker will eventually replace the presidium, which is similar to the collective leadership found in communist countries.
Currently, the thirty-three members of the presidium [elected by and from assembly members] take turns presiding over meetings. Under this system, the chairperson of an afternoon session often ignores the decisions made by the chairperson of the morning meeting, resulting in inefficiency or even chaos. The main advantage of a speaker is that the National Assembly gains an experienced person to preside over meetings.
Professor Lu is also concerned that with the new speaker, the National Assembly will convene very frequently. As a matter of fact, the 1st Amendment stipulates clearly that only the president can call extra sessions [except for meetings to recall or impeach the president or vice president]. So, the president decides whether a session is necessary.
I wish to once again point out that—although Mr. Hsu denies it—the greatest differences between the KMT and the DPP concern national identity. If we had accepted the DPP’s proposal to change the term “free area [of the Republic of China]” to “Taiwan,” it would have meant giving up our claim to the territory of the mainland and the goal of seeing both sides unified. National unification is a vital principle; there is no compromising on this point.
Another major dispute concerns legislative reform. While the DPP advocates maintaining a unicameral Legislature, the KMT supports “one Legislature, two houses.” The KMT believes it would be dangerous to abolish the National Assembly and give all the power to the Legislative Yuan. Besides, overburdening the Legislative Yuan would inevitably delay the passage of bills, which is already a serious problem. That would not only hinder the operations of the Executive Yuan but also have a negative impact on Taiwan’s political environment.
Moreover, if we were to abolish the National Assembly and strengthen the Legislature, more than fifty articles of the Constitution would have to be revised. This is why the KMT supports the National Assembly. We will study the situation carefully to map out a future government system, but we want to make the decision after a public consensus has been reached.
Hsu: I wish to make it clear again that the real dispute between the DPP and the KMT concerns our future political system. The KMT is using national identity as an excuse to defend its position.
The DPP believes the Constitution needs an overhaul. It was written in the 1940s on the Chinese mainland and is no longer suitable for Taiwan. After more than four decades of drastic change, Taiwan is vastly different. The Constitution simply does not fit our needs.
Professor Lu rightly said that once the DPP becomes the majority party, it will revise the Constitution. We believe the Constitution, as it stands now, is not enforceable. If there are any problems in its implementation, the KMT must take full responsibility.
We expect several problems with the current Constitution. First, everyone supports direct presidential elections, but implementing them will create some difficulties. The most serious is that the president’s powers and responsibilities are not clearly stipulated. This will be especially problematic after the post of Taiwan provincial governor becomes elective this coming December. Interactions between the president, the Executive Yuan, the National Assembly, and the Legislature will face new challenges. A directly elected governor will probably be more powerful than the premier, who is appointed [by the president, with the consent of the Legislature]. And if they belong to different parties, there will be disputes.
Mr. Shieh said the National Assembly speaker and deputy speaker posts are merely symbolic. But he is assuming a situation in which the president, premier, and majority of assembly members belong to the same party, as they do now. This situation will not last forever. In the future, if a minority-party National Assembly speaker does not see eye to eye with the president, he could make things difficult for the president. Thus, the creation of a speaker does expand the power of the National Assembly. In addition, the provision allowing the National Assembly itself to determine the procedure for exercising its powers could lead to absurdities, such as the assembly monitoring the spending of its own budget.
The DPP’s proposal to abolish the National Assembly was vetoed this time, but we will try again. If the assembly continues to exist, how can we become a full-fledged constitutional democracy? The KMT must wake up to reality and face the problem. Only if both parties narrow their differences can negotiations on the political system progress. Otherwise, we foresee more problems in our political development. We should no longer make partial revisions to the Constitution simply because the KMT insists on sticking to the five-power system or to its reunification policy.
Su: During the recent assembly session, the focus of conflicts lay not necessarily in national identity—the disputes over the political system were also serious. The idealistic approach of the DPP in trying to institute radical constitutional reforms was in striking contrast to the KMT’s efforts to maintain the status quo. From a purely academic point of view, the KMT’s pragmatic approach of making limited revisions was best considering the current political situation.
The DPP advocates a presidential system, but it should rethink whether this really meets the country’s needs. Given the current conflicts between political parties, it is impossible to enforce a genuine presidential system, particularly if the president and the National Assembly speaker belong to different parties.
Mr. Shieh said the KMT has no room for compromise; such a stubborn attitude cannot lead to a wise policy. The KMT should be more flexible, and the DPP should not be so idealistic. We all know the DPP has many worthwhile plans and is very responsive to the public’s wishes. But it is better to be pragmatic. Both sides should compromise more in order to pass successful constitutional revisions.
Concerning the speaker post in the National Assembly. I agree with Mr. Shieh. According to the 1st Amendment, only when the assembly meets to recall the president or vice president or to pass a resolution on the impeachment of the president or vice president, will the session be called by the speaker. It is merely an exaggeration by the mass media that the speaker post expands the power of the assembly.
I think we still should address the problem of the unicameral or bicameral Legislature soon. Mr. Shieh said that the KMT is promoting a two-chamber system. This is incorrect. The KMT has not started to research this. And younger assembly members, especially those from Taipei and Kaohsiung, do not promote a two-chamber system. On the other hand, the DPP tends to ignore some of the problems Shieh mentioned. For example, maintaining a unicameral system would worsen current problems with the Legislature, including laziness and abuse of power. We can’t expect these to simply disappear with time if we don’t do anything about them.
If we want to keep the one-chamber system, we should deal with the problems in the Legislature. In other words, clarify its operations and outline reasonable responsibilities. The DPP cannot ignore these problems as long as it continues promoting a one-chamber system.
I agree with Mr. Shieh’s analysis of the problems, but I don’t think a bicameral system will work. It’s too optimistic. It may create more serious problems. People ignore the fact that the two chambers wouldn’t necessarily check and balance each other. Also, they must be structured differently. Many promote a bicameral system, but so far no one has discussed how the two chambers should be structured. If we don’t figure this out, we will just end up with two Legislative Yuans. In the United States and Britain, the two-chamber system has a historical back ground. I am pessimistic about adopting it in Taiwan. I think a unicameral system is more likely to solve our problems. If we really think through the existing problems in the Legislature, we may be able to form a consensus supporting a unicameral system in one or two years. I disagree that the next constitutional revisions should wait until after the presidential election. Whenever there is a consensus, we should act. When should we evaluate whether to have a one-chamber or two-chamber Legislature? Now.
Lu: Mr. Hsu said that the DPP does not recognize the existing Constitution and that if problems arise in its implementation, the KMT should be held fully responsible. What kinds of problems may occur?
First, consider the situation if the president belonged to a different political party from the majority of legislators or assembly members. If the president was a KMT member and the Legislature was controlled by the DPP, then the president would have to nominate a DPP member as premier. But a president elected by popular vote is supposed to be directly responsible to the electorate. Given the current conflicts between political parties, the result would be political chaos.
Second, conflicts between the Legislature and the National Assembly may intensify. The KMT holds a majority in the assembly and party decision-makers still control party members. But in the upcoming Third National Assembly, this might not be the case—and if not, serious conflicts are likely to erupt. To reduce the chance of such conflicts, each political party should strengthen its role by, for example, enhancing its policymaking apparatus. In addition, more attention should be paid to constitutional interpretation, and public education on constitutional democracy should be emphasized. We should revise the Constitution again only as a last resort, and only if a consensus is reached on the above-mentioned controversial issues.
Third, despite the KMT’s insistence on retaining it, the five-power government system seems to have become merely a name. The current Control Yuan members are appointed by the president, and the Examination Yuan is a yuan in name only—it could be downgraded to a commission of the Executive Yuan. I predict that this country will eventually have a three-power political system.